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The  focus  of this  paper is  on the  evolving changes  in organization
structure now underway  in regional cooperatives headquartered in  the
Midwest, and the potential dilemmas these changes may present to  those
charged with directing and managing these organizations.  The under-
lying stimulus for organizational change  is  the enormous  and traumatic
adjustment process  taking place in Midwest agriculture, brought on  in
part by the world collapse of food and feed grain prices and  in part by
the effects  of persistent high real  interest rates on the economic
viability of a substantial number of excessively levered farm enter-
prises.  Cooperative organizations, local  and regional, are being
affected in dramatic ways by the  forces which have been plaguing Mid-
American farmers.  The  approach in this paper will be  to  discuss
traditional cooperative organization in the Midwest, identify
alternative organizational responses  to  the  forces  stimulating change,
and finally to  suggest some possible dilemmas confronting directors and
managers  in  their choices  of alternative organizational  forms.
Traditional Organization of Midwest Cooperatives
The general  rubric under which Midwest cooperatives have organized
is found in the Rochdale Principles, promulgated in England during the
Industrial Revolution.1 I do not  intend to  review these principles
here.  Suffice  it  to  say that not every cooperative adheres  to  every
1  For a detailed discussion of cooperative principles, see  E.P.
Roy,  "Cooperatives:  Development, Principles, and Management,"  The
Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc.,  Danville, Illinois, 61832,
611 pages.principle, but two principles have been important to  the organizational
form which has evolved in this  region.  Those who promoted cooperatives
in the 1920's and 30's preached the  gospel of open membership and
democratic control, and these  ideas became deeply ingrained  in the
respective organizations as  they developed.  The upper Midwest, with
its  strong rural populist tradition and its cooperatively oriented
Scandinavian heritage, was a natural place in which to  organize a
system of  farmer-member owned, free standing local cooperatives, which
in turn own and control  a regional organization.  This  is  fundamentally
a "bottoms up" control  structure where,  at  least in theory, ultimate
authority and control resides  in  the  local  cooperative affiliates.  The
federated form of cooperation contrasts with the centralized form of
organization, common in the  east and southeastern part of the United
States  in which authority and control  is  from the  top down.  The
centralized cooperative  owns,  directs,  and manages  the  entire  system
including the  local units.
Democratically controlled federated organizations, as  it  turns
out, while philosophically satisfying to members and certain observers,
are organizationally  cumbersome.  Membership  focus  is  on the  local
cooperative, and  is  often myopic.  It  is  easier to  see where local
interests  lie than  it is  to  see where  the collective  interest of  a
cooperative system lies.  This  reality, coupled with the premise  that
authority and control reside at  the  local level, makes  it difficult  for
regional organizations  to  respond swiftly to  changing economic,
technical and other  environmental factors.  Because  the  relationship
between the  local  and the regional  is  typically non-contractual  in  this
2part of the  country, a change  in direction by a regional which  fails  to
capture  the understanding and support of  its  local affiliates may face
the  threat of  local  discord and, perhaps,  defections.  Thus, unless  a
regional is  willing to accept  substantial adverse  consequences,  it  must
invest substantial time  in planting, cultivating and harvesting support
for major directional moves.
The  foregoing process  is not  to be  regarded as being all bad.
Proposals  that are  fair game for discussion, argument, compromise, and
some aging before they are accepted, can result in better decisions
than those which are decreed  from on high.  Further, wide spread
participation  in the process may generate a sense of  involvement and
commitment that might not otherwise occur.  But, good and widely
supported decisions need to be made  on a timely basis  to be  effective.
This may very well be the Achilles heel  of the  federated form of
cooperation, at  least as  it presently operates.
In point of fact,  the  federated form has worked reasonably well  in
the Midwest, at least until recently.  The cumbersome machinery clanked
along serving farmer's needs  in an acceptable fashion.  Weak organiza-
tions,  at both the  local  and regional level,  tended to  last longer than
their economic effectiveness should have dictated, but they were
eventually winnowed out through liquidation, merger, or  consolidation.
The  slow weeding out process reduced economic  efficiency to be  sure,
but the process was generally humane, and when the end came, most of
the  interested parties understood the  reasons  for  it, even though they
might not have liked them.
3A number of factors  contributed to  the historic  "workability" of
the federated system in the Midwest.  Cooperatives  generally sprung up
in response to  genuine market failures, both on the  commodity marketing
side and the  input purchasing side of farming operations.  Farmers
rightly believed that they were receiving too  little  for what they
produced, and were paying too much for what they purchased.  Thus,  they
found it easy  to commit  themselves  to cooperative ventures.
The  original organizations were reasonably simple one-product or
limited-product  companies at both the  local  and regional  levels.  For
example, oil  companies sprung up  to  service farm heating and machinery
fuel needs,  grain cooperatives to provide a market for grain and
perhaps mix and sell  feed, and dairy cooperatives to  receive  and
process milk into  a fairly limited number of products.  Further,
management and staff in the  early days of both local and regional
organizations almost  always  came out of farm backgrounds and they could
easily empathize with the needs and problems  of farmer patrons.
In the  1940's,  50's and 60's,  local and regional cooperatives
slowly evolved into larger and more complex multiproduct firms.  Year-
to-year changes were frequently  imperceptible -- a process  that might
best be  described as  muddling along, rather  than a purposeful process
which changed the  direction and scope of operations.  The  exception to
this was  the  dramatic restructuring of the  cooperative  dairy processing
sector  in the  late  1960's.
As  the  founding members gradually phased out of their respective
organizations through retirement and/or death, they were succeeded by
second and third generation members whose cooperative zeal differed
4from the  founders.  There  is a core of members, which in my opinion has
been shrinking over time, who  are committed to the cooperative form of
business.  There  is a second group who are committed to  cooperatives
but in a less  intense degree, and there  is a third group of nominal
members, who regard the  coop as  simply another place  to buy inputs  or
sell  products, and perhaps  as  a device  to  create a degree of
competition that might not otherwise exist  in that particular
marketplace.
The combination of early momentum, a lethargic agricultural sector
(until the  1970's),  and a high degree of member  indifference permitted
structural change  to  take place without great  damage to  the federated
form.  Various consolidations and mergers took place, not always
happily, but without lasting rancor.  Territorial limits  were extended
at both the  local and regional level.  Throughout this  process,  the
persistent regional message being broadcast to  the  countryside was,
"You are the  boss!"
The pace began to  change in the  1970's.  The explosion in
agricultural export markets,  accompanied by the Arab oil embargo  and
the related shortage of various petroleum-based products, had
substantial  impacts on  local and regional organizations.  For some,  the
boom postponed the  inevitable  day of reckoning with what turned out  to
be very temporary transfusions of income.  Once relatively simple
marketing or farm supply cooperatives now became much more complex
multi-function firms  providing some  combination of marketing and  farm
supply services.  We saw the  emergence of super regionals  in the
petroleum and chemical areas,  financed through commitments by regionals
5which later proved to be awkward or disastrous  in some cases.  The
agricultural sector was no  longer lethargic, and the pace and urgency
of the decision process heightened to  levels probably never before
achieved.  However, the resulting organizational stress was overwhelmed
by the general euphoria that prevailed about  the expected golden future
status of the agricultural sector.  Good times permit organizational
slack to be  endured.
But what went up  in the  1970's  came down in a resounding crash  in
the  1980's.  Local and regional cooperative organizations which had
borrowed time in the  1970's  came  to  pay  the piper.  Generally, weak
organizations disappeared through liquidation or, more commonly,
through merger or consolidation with stronger ones.  But  the shakedown
process  is not  over.  In an environment which  is dictating disinvest-
ment, many cooperatives are trapped with redundant assets and high debt
service requirements.  In many cases,  they are not attractive merger
partners, and in the  case of local  cooperatives because of  their
vulnerability, not very reliable sources  of supply for regionals  or
outlets  for products  sold by regionals.  At the  other end of  the
spectrum, certain cooperative  organizations have weathered the economic
crisis quite well.  In fact,  some local units have emerged not only
intact, but  in some cases,  very strong financially.  I will have more
to  say about these units and their potential impacts on regional
organizations a bit  later.
Weak and vulnerable  local cooperatives  are  an especially difficult
problem for regional organizations under the present federated
structure.  To be cost effective,  regionals must achieve near optimum
6capacity utilization and scale economy exploitation.  They need to
maintain efficient assembly and distribution systems,  which dictates
the maintenance or even growth  in market  or supply area presence.  In
an effort to keep certain troubled local units  alive,  regionals have
taken a much more active role  in providing advisory and financial
support until such units  can be made whole again or replaced through
merger or other means,  so  that a market or supply area presence is
maintained.  Unfortunately,  these efforts  to be helpful are not always
viewed with equanimity by the subject  local,  or other  locals which are
observing the process,  for  that matter.  Local cooperatives  in
difficulty, just as  farmers  in difficulty, are often times difficult  to
deal with.  The  strong populist, grass roots philosophy which has been
nurtured over  the years makes  the apparent  reversal in the  master-
servant roles  fertile ground in which to  grow conflict between local
and regional units.  Beleaguered farmers  and their organizations do  not
find it  difficult to place a large black hat on their far away regional
affiliates.
At the regional level a different perception of reality exists.
Regional organizations, which have committed financial resources  to  the
preservation of certain locals  are,  of course, concerned about their
fiduciary responsibilities  to  their membership as  a whole.  Thus,  the
aid they provide is,  wisely, not without strings, which, of  course,
tends  to grate on the  local organization.  There  is  a view at  the
regional  level,  supported by substantial evidence,  that problems
arising out of an adverse general agricultural situation are,  in many
cases, compounded by inept  local management and direction.  Slow or
7inappropriate response to  changed economic conditions, unwillingness or
inability to  deal with the  redundant asset problem, a reluctance or
inability  to price products  or services  at reasonable margin-producing
levels,  the  inability to control  costs  in line with reduced volumes,
and the unwise management of accounts receivable, have made  some local
units certain candidates for failure.  Because a regional's  own
performance  is  tied to what happens  at the  local  level,  it  is  reluctant
to  tie  it's  fate  to what  it  sees as  potentially controllable factors
which, within the present structure and rubric, are beyond its  control.
Unfortunately for the regional,  it  isn't easy to  tell  farmers and their
local cooperatives, who own you and who you have been calling  "the
boss,"  that they don't have  the  right to  call their own operating
shots.
Alternative Regional Intervention Responses
What is  the  regional  to do with a recalcitrant member coop when
the latter's performance not only puts  its own existence  in jeopardy,
but jeopardizes the interests  of the  regional and, therefore,  other
locals as well.  This  issue  is  being pondered and dealt with in
virtually every regional organization in the Midwest.  The  responses
are far from homogeneous for  the very good reason that  the  issue  is  a
complicated one.  One response, not currently in vogue,  is  not to
intervene at all but simply let  the  weak fail and  the fittest survive.
A more common response by a regional to  a broken local  is  "lets  fix
it."  After all,  if one member of a family is  sick, all members,  in
some degree,  suffer.  But, what kind of a family is  the federated
regional-local cooperative system?  In this  part of  the  country, there
8are usually no long-term contractual relationships binding the regional
and the  local, and by their own words, regionals are servants  and not
masters of  the system.
As a practical matter, many locals have accepted regional
intervention of some sort  in coping with and/or solving  their problems.
The  traditional intervention has been for  the regional  to  take on a
coach-advisor role.  In some cases, but not all,  this  approach has
worked very well.  However,  I sense  a growing impatience with it at  the
regional  level.  The  local  is  free  to  accept or reject the  advice as  it
sees  fit,  and often chooses to reject it.  Furthermore, even if advice
is  accepted, it  is  subject to  interpretation as  it  is being executed
and the results are sometimes surprisingly different from those
anticipated.  Given the  increasingly higher stakes  for  the regionals  --
financial support  to  the  locals, potential  loss  of market for  supply
area presence, increased assembly or distribution costs,  and less  than
optimum capacity utilization -- they have been led to  consider more
activist forms of intervention.
One  form of intervention is  for  the  regional  to provide management
services  to the  local organization on a contract basis.  This approach
is widely used elsewhere  in the country.  Ownership remains local,  but
the regional selects,  trains,  evaluates,  and rewards the  local  manager.
The  local board of directors still has ultimate responsibility for  its
coop, and retains the right to  rid  itself of this  arrangement if  it  is
not satisfied with it.  In other respects, however, the  local  is  likely
to  be operated more like a branch of the regional and, thus,  much more
completely under its  control.
9A next step  up  in regional  intervention is  "selective  local
ownership" by the regional.  Some of this  is happening  in this  area
already, partly as  a means of  filling a vacuum when a local fails,
partly to  fill  in the assembly or distribution voids where a local
doesn't exist, and partly, I think, as  an experiment  designed to  test
the  pluses and minuses  of local  ownership by the  regional.  Some of
these arrangements are regarded  strictly as  stop gap measures  until  the
local can be put back on its  feet.  With this  approach, regional
control of the  local  is complete.
The ultimate degree of regional  intervention is  the  "let's  do  it
all"  approach.  This,  of course, is  the  classic central as  opposed to
federated, cooperative  system.  Control would be strictly top  down.
Locals would be branches of  the centralized organization.  Farmers
would have direct membership  in the central organization and his  or her
net returns would be based on regional performance  and not on  the  local
branch.
The preceding choices  are not mutually exclusive,  so yet another
alternative  is a combined system that embraces one  or more of  them.
These  alternatives represent positions on a spectrum ranging from
little or no control,  to  total  control.  The problem facing regionals
is where to  try to  position themselves on  this  spectrum.
Certainly, as  one observes what is  happening  to American business
enterprise  generally, one sees  increasing centralization of control of
business assets.  "Merger mania"  is  indeed a "mania",  with large firms
gobbling up  the small, and small firms  sometimes  gobbling up  the  large.
This  is happening in part because  (1) the  current political environ-
10ment, with an administration sympathetic to  such activity, permits  it;
(2)  business organizations see advantages  in being a dominate market
factor in the markets  they serve;  (3) computer based management
information systems make management of complex organizations  seem more
feasible;  (4)  certain members  of the management class have an
inordinate  appetite  for power;  and  (5) the  ownership and control of
non-cooperative corporate business enterprise  is virtually unconnected.
Within broad ethical considerations,  the average  stockholder could care
less  about how the  company he  or she  shares  ownership  in organizes
itself, or who controls  it,  as  long as  it creates  satisfactory
dividends,  or capital gains.  The stockholder usually has no business
or  ideological commitment to  the company and, therefore, no particular
loyalty to  it.  When corporate behavior displeases  the  stockholder, or
when satisfactory dividends or  capital gains  are not forthcoming, he  or
she  is  gone.  Stockholders by-and-large vote with their  feet.
If it can be reasonably argued that the farmer-member of  a
cooperative  is just like the  stockholder in a non-cooperative  corpora-
tion, then how cooperatives  organize themselves and who controls  them
really does not make much difference.  On the other hand, if  farmer-
members  are different than stockholders, and if members believe
ultimate control  rests with them, then the  choice of organizational
form does make a difference.
When one examines  the  lack of  interest and participation by many
farmers  in their cooperative affairs, one might be  inclined to  conclude
that they are as disengaged as  the corporate stockholder.  In some
cases this  is  true, but this could be a dangerous  generalization, just
11as  it would be dangerous  to  conclude that because many Americans don't
vote, that most of  them don't care  about what happens  to  the  country.
Regional Cooperative Dilemmas
As regional  directors and managers try to  identify appropriate
intervention responses and make choices for their respective organiza-
tions they need to be  sensitive  to  the  factors which shape member
attitudes and commitments  toward their cooperative.  In  this process
they need to address  several questions which might be thought of  as
dilemmas.
The Top Down  - Bottom Up Power Question
A question that a regional organization and its board of
directors must understand is  where the  fundamental policy making power
lies.  The legal  responsibility  for  the  formulation and articulation of
policy in a cooperative lies with  the board of directors who  delegate
its  execution to  operating management.  Are  boards of  directors a
collection of wise men and women who, by virtue of  their office, have
special  insights  about what is  best for  their membership?  Is policy
really formed in  the board room or  is  it  formed elsewhere?
An interesting perspective -- hypothesis,  if you prefer  --  on
policy formation has been developed by Harlan Cleveland, Dean of the
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. 2 Cleveland has
specifically addressed the  root source  of American foreign policy.
While you may consider  this a quantum  leap away from cooperative policy
2 See Harlan Cleveland,  "Coherence and Consultation:  The
President as Manager of American Foreign Policy,"  Public
Administration Review, Vol. 46,  No.  2, March/April 1986.
12formation, I ask you to bear with me.
Cleveland argues  that  foreign policy is  basically the  "people's
policy"  -- the common sense reaction by the  governed to  changing facts
of international  life.  They develop preferences for how these changing
facts  should be  dealt with.  Cleveland sees  these preferences
developing first as  an "...inchoate  (incipient or  imperfect) popular
consensus" which  "...then  is  codified (arranged) into a systematic
collection by experts, and is  announced by the  'leaders'...  only when
the consensus  is  well  formed."  In short, as he  sees  it,  the wise
leader  strives mightily to  determine the  directions the  "people" want
policy to  take and then tries  to  get in front of the  parade.  To  some
leaders,  this perception of their role will strike a discordant note.
But it does have the familiar sound of "grass  roots"  about  it.  It
suggests  that the  "leader" who hasn't sensed the  direction of the
parade may be marching alone,  or at cross purposes,  or away from those
he  or she would lead.  We have seen some  dramatic political fallout  in
recent years which tends  to support  the Cleveland hypothesis  -- Johnson
on Viet Nam, Nixon on Viet Nam and Watergate, Carter on Iran and on his
capacity to  govern, and perhaps Reagan on Iran-Nicaragua  -- all  of whom
we might reasonably conclude either failed to  identify the  "consensus"
or were victimized by it.
I am going to  ask you to  make the dramatic  leap  from the
application of  Cleveland's hypothesis to  foreign policy formation to
its possible application to the governance of cooperative organiza-
tions.  It seems reasonable to assume  that farmers react in a common
sense way to  the changing facts  of their economic  lives.  Their common
13sense reaction, tempered by their beliefs and values, will lead them to
prefer one  set of propositions  for governing institutions  that effect
their economic  lives  over others.  They don't have much control over
some of these institutions, such as  commercial banks  or other pro-
prietary organizations.  In these cases,  farmers,  like the corporate
stockholder, can vote with their feet.  If,  on the  other hand, they are
in fact a part of their cooperative's governance structure, as  they
have been told many times,  and they believe it,  the  Cleveland
hypothesis,  if  it  is  valid, has  some important implications.  Do  the
leaders  -- regional directors and management -- have a good reading on
whether or not a consensus has been or  is being formed about how
patrons want their cooperative's affairs organized?  Does  that
consensus  about organization differ in a fundamental way from the  one
now in place?
The codification of a consensus among cooperative members  is  not
an easy task, particularly in view of  the generally unhappy economic
situation that currently exists  in agriculture  in this  part  of the
country.  Farmers, as  do  other people,  react to  stress  in varying,
sometimes  rational, sometimes not rational, ways.  There  is  a large
number of  farmers, perhaps  the majority, who are  adapting to  the
changed reality of their circumstances  in a reasonably unemotional and
rational way.  On the  other hand, there  are  some, who knows how many,
who feel  they are victims  of an enormous conspiracy and who  are,
therefore, paranoic about anyone tinkering with their affairs.  I think
it  is  safe to  say, however, that over a wide spectrum of farmers  --
rational  and irrational  -- the trust relationships between them and  the
14institutions developed to  serve them have been tarnished, and in some
cases,  destroyed.
The problem of sorting through and weighting the messages that  are
coming up  from the membership is  enormous.  Those most  inflamed will
generate  the largest number and the  loudest messages.  Messages  from
the more  subtly inclined may be harder to  detect, but detected they
must be.  The danger of misreading "the  consensus" has  severe
organizational implications.  The problem is compounded by the  fact
that consensus formation is  usually not an  instantaneous process,  nor
once formed, is  it static.  A consensus usually takes  time  to  grow, and
once  it has developed, can change.
To  summarize, certain technical and economic factors  are pushing
cooperative organizations  and their regionals toward more rather  than
less  centralized control.  How far the centralization is  pushed needs
to be  examined in the  light of member organizational preferences.  I
don't  think the choice is  'no change' in the present structure, but I
don't think  it's  total centralization either.  There  are a number of
local  cooperatives which are well directed, well managed, and
financially strong.  Some,  in fact, have taken on the  characteristics
of a mini-regional,  and command  serious consideration from alternative
suppliers  and alternative market outlets.  Such organizations are,
therefore, usually not economically dependent on their regional.
Although they are willing to  interact with the regional  on mutual
problems, they are not likely to  accept much centralized direction.
Beneath these super-locals are local  cooperatives, which while not as
large or strong, are competently managed;  although quite  independent,
15they may be susceptible to  limited central  intervention.  Finally,
there are those local units,  generally small and not well managed, who
in many respects are almost entirely dependent on the regional  for
survival.  In a perverse way, they are  also the most resistant  to
regional  advice or other non-financial forms  of  intervention.  I don't
know the precise proportion of membership  in each of  the above  three
catagories, nor how  important each category is  in terms  of its  impact
on  total regional volume.  My guess, based on the  20-80 rule  of thumb
(20 percent of the  firms  representing 80 percent of the business),  is
that the  first category, and a relatively small part of the second are
a regional's  important sources  of supply and/or markets.  So  it  is
likely that the  locals  least dependent on regionals are  their largest
sources of volume.
I don't want to  leave  the  impression that large local units  are
invulnerable  to adversity.  For a variety of reasons, large  locals  can
and do  get  into trouble, just as  some regionals have.  If or when  they
do  get into trouble,  they can create enormous problems  for their
regional  affiliate.  Until they get into  trouble,  though, the  regional
is  likely  to have limited influence on them.  Thus, the dilemma arises
on how the regional should relate  to  these units  in an organizational
sense because, in some respects,  the regional  is more dependent on  them
than  they are on the  regional.
At the  other end of  the  spectrum are  the smaller and frequently
troubled units.  Although they probably constitute  80 percent of  total
cooperatives by number, they represent 20  percent or  less  of regional
business volume.  Individually each such unit represents  a relatively
16small loss  potential to regional.  But,  they have potential power  in an
internal and external political sense because they contain a high
proportion -- I am not certain of the  exact proportion -- of total
farmer membership in cooperatives.  Thus, they are not to  be taken
lightly by the regionals.  Further, because  of their shear numbers,  the
management and financial resources required for effective regional
intervention may be disproportionately high relative to  their
proportion of regional business.
Of various  forms of  intervention, the  idea of regional ownership
of the  local,  which is  in its beginning stages in this  area, needs to
be watched carefully.  Such ownership  is  a mixed blessing because,
while it  does give  the regional control,  the drain on regional
financial and other resources will be substantial.  Supplying and
supporting local asset requirements, which were once  the  responsibility
of the  local  organization, now become a regional  responsibility.  If
such ownership becomes extensive,  the regional management, personnel,
and financial requirements will grow accordingly.  An additional
consideration, if the  selective ownership route  is  followed, is  its
impacts on attitudes of members  of other locally owned and controlled
units.  Do  they read this arrangement  as  a stop gap measure, or  do  they
see  it  as  a prototype for  the  future organization of the regional?  How
will their impressions,  right or wrong, reflect  in their attitude
toward the regional?
The Product Mix and Geography Questions
I would like to  address  two other related issues which I consider
to be uniquely cooperative, and which have major organizational
17implications.  The first one relates to  the product mix selection
process  --  particularly  in regional marketing organizations.  In their
formative years,  regional marketing coops were relatively simple one
product or  limited product  firms.  The products  -- for example, butter,
powder, cheese,  ice  cream -- typically derived from a single raw
material  source  --  milk in this  example.  But over time  in response to
a variety of causes, new products  -- for example, beef, poultry,
margarine  -- from diverse and not necessarily related raw material
sources have come  into  the mix.  This  is where the  game gets kind of
gummy, and points to what I think are  some of  the basic differences
between a cooperative and other kinds of enterprise.
In selecting its product mix a non-cooperative firm  (NFC) is
guided by a relatively simple decision rule  -- relative profitability.
Consider such a firm which markets competing products  -- say high
fructose corn sugar and beet sugar  --  which derive  from different raw
material sources  -- corn and sugar beets.  If high fructose  sugar
becomes more profitable than beet sugar in  the market place, an NCF
will allocate more resources  to  high fructose  sugar, and at the extreme
may even abandon beet sugar altogether.  An NCF's  raw material
suppliers are not  its major concern.  Should the  same decision be made
in a sugar cooperative, where the  interests of sugar beet grower
members -- who may not be  or can not be  corn growers  -- would be
adversely affected?  To members growing them, sugar beets may represent
a profitable cropping choice.  While some persuasive marketing
arguments  -- for example, filling out  the cooperative's sweetener  line
-- could probably be made for such decision, I can't identify a clear
18cut and universal decision rule  that would apply in this  situation.
This problem can be extended to  include other products which may not
compete  in the market place,  for example, turkey and  ice cream, but
which come  from different raw material sources.  If the price of turkey
rises relative  to  ice  cream, should a cooperative allocate more of its
resources  to  the  turkey business  and less  to  the  ice cream enterprise?
What are the respective  impacts on the turkey and milk producers?
On the farm supply side,  the product mix question is  not as
prickly an issue  for cooperatives as  it  is  the product marketing side.
Farmers use many of the  same  inputs, although perhaps  in different
combinations; but even here there are potential conflicts of interest.
What decision rule, for example, would guide  a regional in which not
all members  are livestock feeders,  to allocate  sources  to  the  feed
business rather than, say,  the  fertilizer business?
At the bottom of the  product mix problem is  the  issue  of cross-
subsidization.  Is  it  fair and equitable for members who receive no
benefit  from a particular product  or enterprise, to  contribute  capital
to  support  it?  I include  in capital the value of a going business.
This product mix problem has been compounded by the  fact that what were
once basically marketing cooperatives have taken on farm supply
activities  and what were once basically farm supply cooperatives have
taken on product marketing activities.  Perhaps reflecting the growing
complexity of  the decision process,  there has been some cooperative
disconglomeration involving liquidation, spinning off,  or rearranging
diverse activity.  I regard this  as a healthy  thing.
19A second problem which has muddied the waters for cooperative
decision making has been the geographic expansion of regional
organizations.  Cooperatives usually had their beginnings in a fairly
confined and relatively homogeneous agricultural  region.  Over time,
operations  tended to  expand into areas  that are  less  and less
homogeneous. Interests of farmers  in one place in the expanded
territory can differ markedly from those  in another on a variety of
bases.  Differing and often competing cropping and livestock
enterprises, differing resource constraints, and differing cultural  and
social customs, all  lend themselves  to potential  conflict.
Perhaps the best  illustration of  this problem has been the  outcry
from a certain part  of Texas about  its unwillingness  to  share  in the
losses  of  the  cooperative Farm Credit System.  But there  are other less
dramatic examples.  What is good  for Minnesota-Wisconsin dairy
producers may not be  good for producers  in Arkansas and Texas.
Similarly, the  interests  of livestock producers  outside of the  grain
belt are not always  in happy coincidence with those  of midwest feed
grain producers.
As  in the case  of the product-product mix issue,  the question
confronting the regional  is how it allocates  its  resources
geographically.  For example, if operations  in Minnesota become more
profitable than  in Montana, should the  regional allocate more resources
to Minnesota?  The answer for  an NCF would probably be  quite clear, and
it would be yes.  It  is  not that  clear,  in my view, for a cooperative
organization.  As  in the  case of product mix selection, what is  the
decision rule?
20Where does  this  all lead me?  My general conclusion  is  that,  as
cooperatives  extend their  activities  in a product mix sense and in a
geographic  sense,  they become  infinitely more difficult  to manage than
an NFC.  The  reason is  that the  usual and  somewhat easy  to understand
NCF decision rules, built around relative profitability, may not  and
probably don't apply to  cooperatives.  I hasten to  add that I am not
implying that cooperatives can ignore profitability.  If in fact  they
are  to  survive, and perhaps  grow, they must be  capable of producing a
net margin adequate  to  satisfy the patrons  and to  replenish and perhaps
increase  their capital bases.  But lacking a clear set of decision
rules,  product mix and geographic allocation decisions, which must
balance the  interests of heterogeneous patron groups,  are uniquely
difficult and risky in cooperatives.  If Solomon was  in  the cooperative
consulting business, these  are the  kinds of decisions  to which he
should devote his  talents.
Clearly, members are evaluating these  decisions in terms  of  their
common sense and interest.  In addition to  their preferences for how
their cooperative  should be  organized and controlled, they have
preferences as  to  the kinds  of products  and services they  think their
cooperatives should be offering, as  well as  preferences  in regard to
its  geographic coverage.  They perceive and respond  to apparent
conflicts  in developing these preferences.
Conclusions
In the  process of restructuring cooperative organizations, whether
that restructuring be minor or major, a primary task of the board of
directors  and management  is  to  codify  the member consensus on
21organization, products  and services to be  offered, and geographic
extent of activities.  This  doesn't need to be  a passive activity.  I
think it  is  incumbent on the  regional, with active participation by
directors and operating management, to present  an objective appraisal
of the  changed economic realities confronting agriculture.  Members
need to know about alternative organizational configurations  and  the
implications of such configurations  to them both as  users  and
participants in the governing process.  Having presented the  case
clearly,  the regional needs  to be  guided by  the consensus which
develops.  I don't think this process  can be  done piecemeal because
partial understanding of the  facts can lead to wildly erroneous
speculation about what's happening.  The price  of not getting this
process straight may be  that the membership will vote with  their feet,
or in the worst case,  become totally indifferent as  to whether  or not
the organization  is  a cooperative or  some other  form of business
enterprise.
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